Antisemitic Violence in Europe, 2005-2015
Exposure and Perpetrators in France, UK, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Russia

Johannes Due Enstad
Department of Literature, Area Studies and European Languages, University of Oslo
Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), University of Oslo

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About the author:

Johannes Due Enstad is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Literature, Area Studies, and European Languages, University of Oslo. He is also affiliated with the Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX) at the University of Oslo. Enstad currently studies right-wing militancy in post-Soviet Russia, teaches Russian history, and works on his first book, which deals with Russians under German occupation during World War II and will be published by Cambridge University Press. Enstad has previously worked as a researcher at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and the Center for Studies of the Holocaust and Religious Minorities.
Summary

How often do incidents of antisemitic violence occur in contemporary Europe, and what trends are showing? How exposed are Jewish populations in different countries? Who commits these crimes? We need to answer such questions as precisely as possible in order to effectively combat and prevent antisemitism in general and violent antisemitism in particular, but we lack the knowledge to do so because systematic studies of the subject are few and far between. As a step towards filling this research gap, the current report presents some tentative findings about violent antisemitism in a sample of European countries and proposes directions for further research.

Combining incident data based on police reporting with a 2012 survey on antisemitism carried out by the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), this report tentatively compares the levels of antisemitic violence in different countries. The seven-country sample contains comparable data for France, UK, Germany and Sweden only. Among these countries, Jews’ exposure to antisemitic violence appears to have been highest in France, lower in Sweden and Germany, and lowest in the United Kingdom.

Figures for Norway, Denmark and Russia are not directly comparable because of differing data sources. However, Russia clearly stands out with a very low number of incidents considering Russia’s relatively large Jewish population. Russia is also the only case in which there is little to indicate that Jews avoid displaying their identity in public.

Available data on perpetrators suggest that individuals of Muslim background stand out among perpetrators of antisemitic violence in Western Europe, but not in Russia, where right-wing extremist offenders dominate. Attitude surveys corroborate this picture in so far as antisemitic attitudes are far more widespread among Muslims than among the general population in Western Europe.

The findings presented here are tentative. More and better data as well as more research are needed in order to form a more accurate picture of the nature and causes of antisemitic violence, a prerequisite for determining relevant countermeasures.
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Introduction

Antisemitism—hate and hostility directed at Jews because they are Jews—was largely discredited in the West after the Holocaust but continues to be manifested in both attitudes and actions. According to a 2015 survey published by the Pew Research Center, antisemitic attitudes in European countries are shared by varying proportions of the population, from 28 per cent in Poland to 7 per cent in France and the United Kingdom.¹

Actions, however, speak louder than attitudes, and countries with low levels of antisemitic attitudes, like France, can still have high levels of antisemitic incidents. Since the turn of the millennium, the number of antisemitic incidents registered worldwide has risen sharply (see Figure 1). In the United States, however, which has the largest Jewish population after Israel, the level has decreased since 1994,² which means that the increase in Europe is greater than indicated in the graph below.

Antisemitic incidents are most often manifested in speech or acts of vandalism, but there is also a violent dimension. The terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015 and in Copenhagen the following month are among the most extreme cases in recent years. Such attacks are rare, but violent attacks against Jews on a smaller scale occur frequently in several European countries. Incidents

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of violence are probably among the most important reasons why many Jews feel unsafe and avoid displaying their identity in public. According to a 2012 survey, one in five Jews in Sweden and the United Kingdom, one in four in Germany, and almost half in France stated that they had considered emigrating because they felt unsafe. In 2015 around 10,000 Jews left western Europe for Israel, the largest number to do so since 1948. Figures like these, showing that antisemitism in today’s Europe is perceived as a major threat by large numbers of Jews, underscores the need for updated knowledge. Only once we have sufficient knowledge about the phenomenon and its development will it be possible to say whether there is reason to warn or reassure and to decide on relevant countermeasures.

This report poses three main questions: What do we actually know about the level and dynamics of antisemitic violence in different European countries? What can be said about the variation in Jews’ exposure to such violence across different countries? And what do we know about the perpetrators? Although there is no shortage of reports on antisemitic incidents, they are generally country-specific, do not specifically examine exposure to violent incidents, and fail to draw comparisons between countries. The main obstacles to comparison are differences in reporting levels by victims and different police registration practices. As we shall see, however, the first of these obstacles may be overcome by using available data on reporting levels among Jews in different countries. The second obstacle, different police registration practices, is harder to neutralize. Nevertheless, it is possible to make tentative comparisons between certain countries by combining incident reporting data with results from the 2012 survey on antisemitism conducted by the European Union’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). Comparisons are important because they provide a basis for explaining why levels of violence and exposure and the types of perpetrator vary across countries. Knowledge about causes of variation will in turn prove useful for developing countermeasures. This report does not explain variation, but takes a first step towards doing so by conducting a tentative comparison across countries.

The sample consists of seven European countries: France, UK, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Russia. A limited sample was necessary for reasons of time and resource constraints. France, United Kingdom, Germany and Russia were included because these countries have the largest Jewish minorities in Europe. Moreover, these countries have institutions that have collected and published data on antisemitic incidents over the past 10 years.

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3 See Figure 8 in this report. According to a UK survey carried out in 2014-2015, twenty-five per cent of British Jews had considered leaving the country in the past two years because of rising antisemitism. See Annual Antisemitism Barometer: 2015 Full Report (Campaign Against Antisemitism, 2015), antisemitism.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Annual-Antisemitism-Barometer-2015.pdf.

The Scandinavian countries were included because of the authors’ particular interest in current trends in Norway and neighbouring countries.

Only incidents of violence that occurred between 2005 and 2015 have been counted, including acts of physical violence against individuals and serious attacks on buildings that potentially threatened human life and health (such as fire-bombings). Acts of vandalism, threats and harassment were excluded. Compared to verbal insults and acts of vandalism, physical violence has a greater terrorising impact and should thus be examined separately from the other, usually less serious, types of incidents.

Data and comparability

For violent incidents in France, UK, Germany, and Sweden, two sets of data have been used: figures based on reported incidents, and the results of the FRA survey on antisemitism in Europe. A tentative comparison of violence levels in these four countries appears defensible. Data for the other countries are more fragmented, which makes comparison less reliable.

Incident data for France were obtained from the annual reports of Service de Protection de la Communauté Juive (SPCJ), which cooperates closely with the French police authorities. The SPCJ’s figures are based on incidents reported to the police, and exclude many incidents that were only reported to SPCJ because victims did not want to report them to the police. SPCJ groups violent antisemitic incidents into five categories: terrorist attacks, murder or attempted murder, physical violence, arson, and vandalism. Our count excludes vandalism incidents.

The incident figures for the United Kingdom were obtained from the annual reports of the Community Security Trust (CST), a charity that has registered and regularly reported on antisemitic incidents since 1984. Since 2001 CST has cooperated closely with the British police in registering and investigating incidents, and has the right to report incidents to the police on behalf of victims who do not wish to report them directly to the police. CST classifies six types of antisemitic incidents: extreme violence; assault; damage and desecration of property; threats; abusive behaviour; and antisemitic literature. For the purpose of this report, only the categories extreme violence and assault were included.

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5 See www.antisemitisme.fr.
6 See https://cst.org.uk.
Incident figures for Germany were recorded by German police authorities (KPMD PMK). In this report only incidents categorised as Gewaltdelikte have been counted, which includes murder, attempted murder, assault and battery, fire attacks and explosive attacks.

The figures from Sweden were obtained from the annual reports on hate crimes published by Brottförrebyggande rådet (Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention) (Brå). Brå’s statistics are based on crimes reported to the police that are suspected of being motivated by antisemitism. This report includes figures cited in the category våldsbrott (violent crimes) for the period 2008–2015. Between 2005 and 2007, Brå used the category brott mot person (crimes against individuals), which covers physical violence, harassment and threats. On our request, Brå specified the statistics for 2006 and 2007 in such a way as to enable us to distinguish incidents of violence from harassment and threats. It was not possible to do this with the 2005 figures. We therefore extrapolated the figures for incidents in 2005 from the average percentage of violent crimes among the total number of registered antisemitic incidents in the period 2006–2015. Note that the figures for reported incidents in Sweden are considerably higher from 2008 onwards compared with the period 2005–2007 (see Table 1). The increase most likely resulted from changes in police registration procedures and the definition of hate crimes.

In addition to the figures based on reported incidents, this report also makes use of the FRA survey on antisemitism conducted in September–October 2012 with respect to France, UK, Germany and Sweden. In that survey, Jewish respondents in several countries (1,192 in France, 1,468 in the United Kingdom, 608 in Germany and 810 in Sweden) answered a series of questions via an open online questionnaire concerning their experiences with antisemitism. The

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9 Beginning in 2008 a new field was introduced into the Swedish police’s national system for registering reported crimes. From then on, police officers had to register whether or not a hate crime suspicion applied. In 2008, moreover, the definition of hate crime was expanded by removing the criterion requiring the perpetrator to belong to Sweden’s majority population and the victim to a minority group. See Klara Klingspor and Anna Molarin, Hatbrott 2008 (Stockholm: Brottförrebyggande rådet, 2009), 19, www.bra.se/bra/publikationer/arkiv/publikationer/2009-07-01-hatbrott-2008.html.

results are a useful supplement to the data based on reported incidents. First, the FRA data on exposure to violence are comparable by virtue of the fact that they were collected in the same way in the respective countries. Second, the FRA survey contains information on the level of reporting among Jews subjected to antisemitic violence. In general, one should not use police reporting to compare crime levels across countries because of differences in victims’ reporting propensities and in registration practices of national police and judicial authorities, but the FRA survey partly makes up for this problem by providing us with information on reporting levels. This enables us to adjust our incident data and gain a more accurate picture of the real level. Yet two weaknesses remain. The FRA data represent a snapshot, and cannot say anything about developments over time. We also lack information that would enable us to adjust for variations in national registration practices. From an overall perspective, nonetheless, the incident reporting data combined with the FRA survey constitute sufficient basis for making a tentative comparison of violent antisemitism levels in France, the United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden.

The figures for incidents in Norway, Denmark and Russia, on the other hand, are unsuitable for making comparisons due to fragmented or unspecified reporting and different methods of data collection. Nevertheless, the report presents findings for these countries as well.

The Norwegian police authorities regularly publish reports on hate crime, but antisemitism is registered as a separate category by the Oslo Police District only, and only since 2012. The reports cite seven incidents of hate crimes motivated by antisemitism, none of which involved violence. Incidents of antisemitism can also be reported to the Jewish community in Oslo and the Norwegian Centre against Racism, but neither institution keeps statistics on such incidents. For lack of registered data on antisemitic incidents, we conducted searches in the Atekst news archive and in the Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitism database, and we consulted relevant secondary literature.

Danish incident data were obtained partly from reports published by the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) and partly from the Jewish Community in Denmark’s security organisation Jewish Security Denmark (JSD). PET’s reports cover the period 2005 to 2013; no report was published for 2014. PET’s reports for the period 2008 to 2013 provide no basis for identifying all incidents of violence, since only isolated examples are given for those years. In

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13 See www.retriever.no/product/mediearkiv.
14 See antisemitism.org.il/list/1?lang=en.
2015 the Danish National Police took over responsibility for preparing annual reports dealing with hate crimes in Denmark. Like PET’s reports, the 2015 report only cites examples of reported incidents of antisemitism, but on request, the Danish National Police specified whether or not the 13 cases registered in 2015 involved violence. Figures were also obtained from JSD’s Section for Mapping and Sharing of Knowledge about Antisemitic Incidents (AKVAH), which from 2012 to 2014 published its own incident reports.

The figures for incidents in Russia were collected from the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis in Moscow, which since 2004 has collected data (based on media reporting) on racist and xenophobic incidents. Supplementary information was obtained from the annual reports published by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL).

The findings regarding perpetrators are based partly on incident reporting data and partly on FRA’s survey on antisemitism, which included questions dealing with the perceived motives and backgrounds of perpetrators. Other relevant studies, attitude surveys and journalistic reports were drawn upon as well.

### Incidence and exposure

**Table 1: Reported incidents of antisemitic violence, with estimates adjusted for different levels of reporting**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1 continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Estimated count</th>
<th>Killing incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1023</td>
<td>4092</td>
<td>3 (9 killed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>3844</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(1 killed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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17 See www.mosaiske.dk/akvah-3.


19 Data on reporting levels are from the 2012 FRA antisemitism survey. Thanks to Daniel Staetsky of the Institute for Jewish Policy Research for help in obtaining these data. The counts assume that reporting levels have not changed significantly during the period in question.
France, UK, Germany and Sweden

As shown in Table 1, France and the UK have the largest total number of violent incidents when we adjust for different reporting levels, estimated at 4,092 and 3,844 incidents during the period 2005–2015. Next comes Germany, with an estimated 1,917 incidents, and, finally, Sweden with 516 incidents. We see no clear downward or upward trends (Figure 2). Levels have remained consistently high compared to the 1990s, with some substantial year-to-year variations.

It is often claimed that the number of antisemitic incidents increases in connection with flare-ups in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. With regard to reported incidents of violence, we see that this appears true to some extent, but no clear pattern emerges. Only in some cases do the conflicts in Gaza in 2006, 2008–2009, 2012 and 2014 coincide with increases in the number of reported incidents.20

Figure 2: Development over time. Reported incidents of antisemitic violence, 2005–2015 (France, United Kingdom, Germany and Sweden)

20 A similarly vague connection between the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and antisemitic incidents in Europe was found in a 2011 study based on Belgian data. The study found that although there was a statistically significant increase in the number of incidents during the conflict in Gaza in 2008–2009, the effect was brief, and no more durable connection between events in the Middle East and acts of antisemitism could be established. See Dirk Jacobs et al., “The impact of the conflict in Gaza on antisemitism in Belgium”, Patterns of Prejudice 45, no. 4 (1 September 2011): 341–360, accessible at http://germe.ulb.ac.be/uploads/pdf/articles%20online/PatternsofPrejudiceproof.pdf.
In order to conduct a meaningful comparison of the accumulated levels of incidents in France, UK, Germany and Sweden, the size of the Jewish minorities must be taken into account. Measured in number of reported incidents per 1,000 Jews—a measure indicating exposure, or Jews’ chances of being subjected to antisemitic violence—Sweden comes out on top with a score four times higher than France, with Germany and the UK in the middle (Figure 3).

Have Swedish Jews really been four times more exposed to antisemitic violence than French Jews in the period 2005-2015? An important reservation is called for at this juncture, regarding the comparison of crimes reported to the police. Although the figures have been adjusted for different levels of reporting, a substantial problem remains in the comparison of police-reported data, namely the differences in registration and categorisation practices. In Sweden, authorities register crime in a more comprehensive way than in other countries. In fact, Swedish police statistics give the impression that Sweden is one of Europe’s most crime-ridden countries, yet victim surveys disprove this picture. This distinctive feature of Swedish crime statistics likely helps explain Sweden’s position in Figure 3. Without detailed information about authorities’ registration and categorisation practices in the various countries, one should be highly sceptical when assessing comparisons based on police data only. We now move on to examine a different dataset, the FRA antisemitism survey conducted in 2012.

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In the 2012 FRA survey, Jewish respondents in France, the UK, Germany and Sweden were asked whether they had been subjected to antisemitic violence during the past 12 months or the past five years. Even though the FRA data only cover the period 2008–2012, they nonetheless offer an alternative measure of the level of antisemitic violence in these countries, serving as a useful supplementary dataset which both counters, confirms and nuances the picture emerging from data based on reported incidents. As Figure 4 shows, France scores highest on violence experience in the past 12 months as well as in the past five years, while Sweden comes second for 12 months and third for five years. Germany scores second-highest for violence experience in the past five years. When we also look at the question asking respondents whether they had witnessed an incident of violence during the past 12 months, France scores highest, with Sweden second and the UK roughly equal with Germany (Figure 5).
It is also relevant to assess perceptions of safety and worries related to antisemitism as an indirect measure of exposure. We find that Sweden and France score considerably higher on certain questions dealing with safety (Figures 6 and 7), indicating that French and Swedish Jews are more exposed than German and British Jews.

Respondents’ answers to other questions about safety and concern leave a somewhat different impression, however, as France scores much higher than the other countries on questions on considering emigration, worrying about being physically attacked, and regarding antisemitism as a
major problem in the country (Figures 8-10). Note that on these three questions, Germany—not Sweden, as one might expect from Figures 6 and 7—scores second-highest.
To sum up, we see that the FRA survey results challenge the figures based on reported incidents with respect to the apparently low exposure of French Jews (as illustrated in Figure 3). At the same time, the FRA data appear to confirm that Jews in the UK are less exposed than in the other three countries. The results for Sweden and Germany are more diffuse. Sweden scores second to and slightly lower than France on some questions about exposure and safety (Figures 4–7), but on other questions Germany scores second-highest. One possible explanation for the high level of concern among French Jews may be that France has witnessed more serious incidents than the other countries. France is the only country among these four in which fatal incidents have occurred. The brutal 2012 attack in Toulouse in which three Jewish children were killed occurred only a few months before the FRA survey was conducted, which likely explains some of the strong sense of insecurity among French Jews as displayed in Figures 8 and 9 in particular.\(^{23}\)

**Norway**

In Norway, 10 incidents of antisemitic violence were registered for the period 2005–2015. This could be considered a low count, but Norway is a small country with a small Jewish minority (approximately 1,300). The smaller the group of potential victims, the more serious even a small number of incidents may be perceived. As in other European countries, there is evidence to the effect that some Norwegian Jews conceal their identity in certain circumstances, but currently we

\(^{23}\) See *Technical report: FRA survey*, 32.
know little about the reasons for this behaviour and how widespread it is. The Norwegian Centre for Holocaust Studies is currently conducting a survey on antisemitism (due late 2017), which will provide more information on this issue and on Norwegian Jews’ exposure to antisemitism in general.

**Denmark**

In Denmark, a total of 20 incidents of antisemitic violence were registered for the period 2005–2015. Besides France, Denmark is the only country in our sample in which a murder incident has occurred: in February 2015, a Jewish security guard was killed in connection with the attacks on Krudttønden and a synagogue in Copenhagen. Prior to this incident, there were already several signs to suggest that many Danish Jews felt they had to conceal their Jewish identity in public.

**Russia**

Russia clearly stands out with a very low number of registered incidents of antisemitic violence in proportion to its large Jewish population (approximately 190,000). Only 33 incidents were found for the period 2005–2015. We must assume that a number of incidents have occurred without being reported in the media and thus not registered in the SOVA Center’s database, but according to Aleksandr Verkhovsky, head of the SOVA Center, the level of antisemitism-related violence in Russia is clearly far lower than in Western European countries. It is also notable that no reports could be found of Russian Jews feeling forced to conceal their identity in public. On the contrary, being Jewish has evidently become “fashionable” among Moscow youth.

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26 Personal communication with Aleksandr Verkhovsky, 1 January 2016.

Perpetrators

France, UK, Germany and Sweden

What do we know about the individuals who commit acts of antisemitic violence? In the FRA survey, respondents in France, the UK, Germany and Sweden who reported having been exposed to violence and serious threats were asked about the perpetrators. The results (Figure 11) indicate that right-wing extremists, who are often associated with antisemitism, in fact constitute a clear minority of perpetrators. Respondents in all four countries most often perceived the perpetrator(s) to be “someone with a Muslim extremist view”. It is also worth noting that in France, Sweden and the UK (but not in Germany) the perpetrator was perceived to be left-wing more often than right-wing.

It is no secret that in France individuals of Arab Muslim background have been responsible for much of the antisemitic violence committed there. Already in March 2002, Norwegian journalist Tove Gravdal reported on rising antisemitism in France, linking the incidents to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: “When the Palestinians’ Second Intifada was launched on 28 September 2000, it added more fuel to the already smouldering fire in France. Young French men of Arabic origin came together over the Palestinian cause, turned French Jews into symbols of Israel, and
launched a wave of attacks on Jewish targets.\textsuperscript{28} The prominent role of Franco-Arab Muslims in French antisemitism over the past 15 years is also confirmed by researchers who have studied the phenomenon.\textsuperscript{29}

For the United Kingdom we can compare the FRA survey findings cited in Figure 8 with data obtained from the Community Security Trust (CST). CST’s figures reflect victims’ perceptions of the perpetrator’s ethnic background (note that a description of perpetrators’ ethnic background was usually given for 30 to 50 per cent of incidents) (Figure 12). The figures appear to confirm the disproportionate representation of individuals with backgrounds from presumably Muslim countries: While white British perpetrators account for 55 per cent of the cases, individuals with backgrounds from countries in South Asia, Africa, and the Arab world would account for the rest, or 45 per cent. The CST reports draw attention to the impact of the Israel-Palestine conflict, mentioning that the share of “non-white” perpetrators typically increases in the wake of “trigger events” in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{30}

For Germany, we can also compare the results of the FRA survey with an alternative dataset. When we compare German respondents’ perceptions of perpetrators with German police data on perpetrator motives, a striking discrepancy emerges. In sharp contrast to the FRA survey,

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure12.png}
\caption{United Kingdom: Perpetrators’ backgrounds in incidents of violence (2006–2014) (CST)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{28} Tove Gravdal, “Jødehets på fremmarsj i Frankrike”, Aftenposten, 1 March 2002.
\textsuperscript{30} See the CST reports for 2009, 2010 and 2013, accessible at http://cst.org.uk.
German police statistics suggest that far-right actors commit most of the violence (see Figure 13). How can this be explained? Perhaps the share of right-wing perpetrators is in fact larger than indicated by the results of the FRA survey. We could also be looking at a categorisation problem. Could it be that German police considers antisemitism a right-wing type of ideology and thus categorises most antisemitic attacks as right-wing, regardless of the perpetrator’s ethnic or religious background? Another issue is the nature of violent incidents categorised by German authorities as anti-Israeli and not antisemitic. In 2014, German police registered 91 violent anti-Israeli incidents (most of them perpetrated by “foreigners”), and one of them, controversially, involved the fire-bombing of a synagogue. The question is how many of the other “anti-Israeli” incidents should really be considered acts of antisemitism. More research is required to clarify this issue.

For the case of Sweden, official reports provide a somewhat obscure picture of perpetrator motivation and background. Reports published by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) suggest that only a minority of incidents is associated with right-wing extremism, which tallies with the results of the FRA survey. For example, in 2005 five of 35 reported incidents of antisemitic hate crime in the category “brott mot person” (crimes against individuals)

![Figure 13: Germany: Characteristics of suspected perpetrators of reported incidents of violence (2005–2014) (FRA 2015/Bundeskriminalamt)](image)


could be related to far-right ideology. Brå remains silent on the remaining 30 incidents.\textsuperscript{33} Between 2008 and 2013 right-wing extremist symbols and speech were registered for between 26 and 37 per cent of reported instances of all antisemitic hate crimes. But even in these cases—as pointed out by Brå—the use of the swastika and similar symbols does not necessarily mean that the perpetrator is a “classic” right-wing extremist. So if only a small proportion of perpetrators are right-wing extremists, who are the others? Brå provides little concrete information about the question, but offers a clue in the 2013 report: “Instead [of right-wing extremism], it is today more common for expressions of antisemitism to be linked to, for example, conflicts in the Middle East, perhaps first and foremost the Israel-Palestine conflict.”\textsuperscript{34} A plausible interpretation of this statement would be that individuals with backgrounds from Middle Eastern/Muslim countries are behind most incidents, which would correspond with the FRA survey results. Moreover, surveys based on interviews with Swedish Jews and police personnel responsible for investigating hate crimes generally support this assumption,\textsuperscript{35} as do several journalistic reports.\textsuperscript{36}

**Norway**

What little information exists on perpetrators in Norway leaves a general impression resembling the Swedish case, in which individuals with backgrounds from Muslim countries and/or left-wing radicals appear to stand out. In Moe and Døving’s 2014 study *Det som er judisk* (The sense of Jewishness), 10 of 21 Jewish informants mentioned having personally experienced antisemitism coming from Muslims, and half of these had experienced violence.\textsuperscript{37} In 2004 Christine Mohn, then head of the Norwegian Association against Antisemitism, stated, “the harassment largely comes from Muslims and left-wing radicals”.\textsuperscript{38} In July 2006 a Jewish man was reportedly assaulted


\textsuperscript{37} Døving and Moe, *Det som er judisk*, 96 (footnote 37); personal communication with Vibeke Moe, 2 January 2017.

\textsuperscript{38} Østli, “Det er typisk jodisk å være redd”. 
in Oslo by a group of Arab men.\textsuperscript{39} In September the same year a radical Islamist fired several rounds at the synagogue in Oslo with an automatic weapon. In January 2009, an antisemitic assault occurred in connection with the Gaza riot in Oslo, and witnesses described perpetrators as appearing to be of Middle Eastern background.\textsuperscript{40} In 2010 the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation ran a story on antisemitism in Oslo schools, in which teachers and Jewish parents described the problems Jewish pupils experienced at schools with many pupils of Muslim background, telling of verbal and sometimes physical harassment in the classroom.\textsuperscript{41}

**Denmark**

In the Danish reports, perpetrators are sometimes described explicitly, particularly in terms of assumed ethnic background. In the cases involving violent assaults on Jews, perpetrators are typically described as boys or men “of Arab appearance”, “Palestinian”, “Middle Eastern” or “Muslim”. In some cases the perpetrators are described as “ethnic Danish” or “unknown”.

Jewish spokespersons in Denmark have given the impression that perpetrators are most often individuals of Muslim and/or Arab background. “The worst ones are in fact Palestinian refugees and immigrants. They demonstrate their hate by placing the blame for events in the Middle East on young Danes who have never set foot in Israel”, said Bent Blüdnikow of the Mosaic Religious Community in 2012.\textsuperscript{42}

**Russia**

Unlike the countries in Western Europe, perpetrators in Russia are described exclusively as right-wing extremists (neo-Nazis and skinheads). Although Russia has Europe’s largest Muslim population (between 15 and 20 million), we have found no instances of perpetrators being referred to as Muslim or similar. This finding contradicts the conclusion reached in a 2008 study stating that levels of antisemitic violence will be greater in countries with large Jewish and Muslim populations.\textsuperscript{43} Russia has far more Jews and Muslims than most Western European countries, yet by all accounts has far fewer incidents of antisemitic violence.

Attitude surveys
As we have seen above, available data suggest that individuals with backgrounds from Muslim countries stand out among perpetrators of antisemitic violence in Western Europe. If this were indeed the case, one would expect Muslims in Western Europe to express higher levels of antisemitic attitudes than the general population. Several attitude surveys, both comparative and country-specific, suggest they do.

In a study of attitudes among five Danish immigrant groups (from Turkey, Pakistan, Somalia, Palestine and the former Yugoslavia) based on data collected by Statistics Denmark in 2004, anti-Jewish attitudes were found to be more widespread among Muslim immigrants than Christian ones (controlled for age, gender, education, income and social/cultural marginalisation). The study also found that Palestinians (all else equal) were more antisemitic than were other groups, indicating that the Israeli–Palestinian conflict played a role. Another important factor was the respondent’s level of religiosity (regardless of religion), which influenced antisemitic attitudes almost as much as the respondent’s religion. Muslim respondents’ high level of religiosity was therefore a key factor in explaining the high level of antisemitism among Muslims. But the statistically most significant explanatory variable proved to be respondents’ general attitude to individuals outside their own group: the greater the intolerance of “others” in general, the more widespread were antisemitic attitudes. In other words, the fact that Muslim respondents displayed antisemitic attitudes more often largely reflects their higher degree of out-group intolerance.

Given that this finding holds for other samples as well, the next logical step for future antisemitism research should be to ask why some groups express higher level of out-group intolerance than others do.

A study of Swedish upper secondary school pupils’ attitudes towards Jews, with data collected in 2003 and 2009, found that respondents of Muslim background showed the highest levels of antisemitism. The study also found that between 2003 and 2009 antisemitic attitudes remained stable for majority Swedes but increased for Muslim youth. Another study of attitudes among Swedish youth, conducted by The Living History Forum in 2010, found that while 19 per

cent of all pupils demonstrated clearly negative attitudes towards Jews, the proportion increased to 55 per cent for pupils of Muslim background.46

The findings from Denmark and Sweden are confirmed by several similar attitude surveys carried out in other European countries in so far as Muslim respondents expressed high levels of antisemitism. An overview of such studies are found in Günther Jikeli’s article “Antisemitic Attitudes among Muslims in Europe: A Survey Review”. Jikeli reviewed several attitude surveys on antisemitism in Europe and found that antisemitic attitudes were significantly more widespread among Muslims than among non-Muslims. Moreover, the surveys show—in line with the Danish study mentioned above—that antisemitic attitudes are more widespread among more devout Muslims and particularly among Muslims with a fundamentalist interpretation of their religion. Another interesting finding is that the high level of antisemitic attitudes among Muslims cannot be explained by differences in education level, income, age, gender or perceived discrimination.47

The most recently published study comes from the United Kingdom and was conducted in the spring of 2015 by the ICM polling institute. The respondents were British Muslims and a sample of the British population as a control group. The survey found that British Muslims scored two to four times higher than the general population on several antisemitic statements. For example, 6 per cent of British people believed that “Jews are responsible for most of the world’s wars” while the figure for British Muslims was 26 per cent. This survey also failed to show any connection between antisemitism and social class or unemployment.48

The FRA survey indicated that perpetrators were perceived as left-wing more often than right-wing in France, Sweden and the United Kingdom. While we lack data to corroborate this finding, attitude surveys do suggest that antisemitism is particularly widespread among those most hostile to Israel. A study from 2006 based on survey data (5,000 respondents in 10 European countries) found that more than half of those who expressed the most radical form of

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criticism against Israel also expressed antisemitic attitudes. A survey conducted in Norway in 2012 found a similar connection.

Conclusion

The overall picture of antisemitic violence in contemporary Europe is clouded by the paucity of comparable data and the lack of systematic studies. While there is much we still do not know about the phenomenon, the data reviewed in this report allow for some tentative findings.

The level of recorded violent incidents increased sharply following the turn of the millennium and remains at a high level compared to the 1990s, with no major upward or downward trends apparent for the period 2005-2015. The increase around the turn of the millennium coincided with rising tensions in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, marked by the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000. Nonetheless, the connection between events in the Middle East and acts of violence against Jews in Europe is vague. First, the number of reported attacks on Jews does not always increase when the conflict in the Middle East flares up. Second, even though some attacks on Jews in Europe do occur in the wake of events in the Middle East, there is no direct causal link between Israeli government actions and subsequent attacks on Jews in Europe. Antisemitic attitudes and violence propensity are likely necessary conditions to trigger such attacks. In other words, events in the Middle East provide individuals in Western Europe who hold antisemitic views and are prone to violence with an occasion to attack Jews.

How exposed to antisemitic violence are Jews in the four countries for which we have tentatively comparable data (France, UK, Germany and Sweden)? To assess exposure, we reviewed the number of reported incidents per Jewish inhabitant (with adjustments made for national differences in levels of reporting) as well as the level of self-reported experience of antisemitic violence and perceptions of insecurity caused by antisemitism. The data have obvious limitations: police data comparability suffers from country-level differences in registration and categorisation practices, and the self-reported data stem from a single survey in which the sample of respondents was not random. We need better data—particularly in the form of more surveys—to be able to gain a more accurate picture. That said, an overall assessment of available data suggests that French Jews appear to be significantly more exposed than German, Swedish

and British Jews. Sweden or Germany rank second depending on the measure we look at, while the United Kingdom ranks lowest.

Even though the data for incidents in Russia are not strictly comparable, it appears safe to say that exposure to antisemitic violence among Jews in Russia is clearly far lower than in Western European countries.

The FRA survey data and other reports suggest that individuals (usually young men) with backgrounds from Muslim countries stand out among perpetrators of antisemitic violence in Western European countries. Note, however, that we do not necessarily see more antisemitic violence in countries with many Muslims and many Jews. Russia has Europe’s largest Muslim population and the continent’s third-largest Jewish population, yet, as noted, incidents of antisemitic violence occur far less frequently there than in Western Europe. Moreover, the violence that does occur in Russia is committed not by Muslims, but by right-wing extremists. The task of explaining this variation should be taken up in future studies.

Attitude surveys indicate that antisemitism is considerably more widespread among Muslims in Western Europe than among the general population, but they also suggest that adherence to Islam in itself does not explain all of the difference. Country of origin appears to play a major role, as does the level of religiosity—the more religious people are, the more antisemitic they are likely to be. One study found that anti-Jewish attitudes were most strongly associated with the respondents’ general intolerance of out-groups.

**Recommendations**

The following recommendations involve measures for data collection and pathways for further research, which are necessary steps towards designing relevant policy measures for counteracting antisemitic violence.

- Data collection should be a priority. Combating violent antisemitism, like other forms of hate crime, depends on solid and up-to-date knowledge, which in turn depends on relevant research based on sound data, preferably both police data and survey data. While police data may be valuable for studying developments in a single country, they will be comparable across countries only if we can correct for varying reporting propensities among victims as well as different registration and categorisation practices among police and judicial authorities. Surveys of victim populations are essential for shedding light on exposure, perceptions, and reporting propensities. International cooperation on
conducting surveys ought to be maximized in order to cover as much of the phenomenon as possible and to facilitate comparison across countries.

- The 2012 FRA survey on antisemitism utilized in this report is valuable, but is now dated, represents only a snapshot in time, and covers only a limited number of EU countries. The second wave of this survey is currently in the making and will provide researchers with fresh, comparable data. In the future, the survey should be repeated every five years or so in order to be able to track trends. Stakeholders in countries not covered by future FRA surveys should arrange to conduct their own surveys along the same lines in order to generate comparable data.

- We need to know more about the concrete circumstances of violent events. Are attacks premeditated or impulsive? Where, when, and in which situations do they typically occur?

- We need more research to shed light on the causes of the high level of antisemitism among Muslims in Western Europe. Current studies indicate that socio-economic status and perceived discrimination play an insignificant role. Factors that appear more decisive are the religion itself, religiosity, country of origin and, not least, intolerance of outgroups in general. All these factors should be analysed more closely in future studies.

- Future research should endeavour to explain why the level of recorded antisemitic incidents has decreased in the United States since the 1990s yet increased in Europe.

- According to Swedish researchers Lars Dencik and Karl Marosi, three different types of antisemitism are at work in contemporary Europe: classic antisemitism, characterised by racial and conspiracy thinking; Enlightenment-based antisemitism, based on opposition to Jewish practices such as circumcision and ritual slaughter; and Israel-derived antisemitism, where hostility towards Israel conflates with or motivates antisemitism. Dencik and Marosi state that Israel-derived antisemitism is the variant that dominates in Western Europe and is most closely associated with violence. Their hypothesis appears plausible in light of the findings presented in this report, and should be subjected to further empirical testing. If it is true that a more violent Israel-derived antisemitism dominates in Western Europe, then we must ask: Why is it more violent, and why has it come to dominate in the West but not in Russia or countries such as Poland or Hungary?

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