


VIBEKE MOE (ED.)

ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN NORWAY 2024

THE NORWEGIAN
CENTER FOR HOLOCAUST
AND MINORITY STUDIES
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INTRODUCTION

The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies conducted a survey on attitudes towards Jews and Muslims in Norway from January 19th to February 2nd, 2024. The purpose was to determine if Norwegians' attitudes towards Jews and Muslims have changed following Hamas' terrorist attack on Israel on October 7th, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza. The target audience for the survey was the Norwegian population over the age of eighteen. The final sample consisted of 1031 respondents.

The project team included Vibeke Moe, Claudia Lenz and Cora Alexa Døving, researchers at The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies, Werner Bergmann from the Center for Research on Antisemitism at the Technical University of Berlin, Ottar Hellevik, professor emeritus at the University of Oslo, Christhard Hoffmann, professor emeritus at the University of Bergen and Irene Levin, professor emerita at Oslo Metropolitan University. Vibeke Moe was project leader.

METHOD

This survey is a condensed version of The Norwegian Center for Holocaust and Minority Studies' previous attitude surveys (conducted in 2011, 2017, and 2022), with some new questions on the Gaza war and the October 7 attack. As with previous surveys, three different dimensions of attitudes were surveyed: 1. social distance, 2. emotions (sympathy, dislike), and 3. prejudices (support for various stereotypical ideas). Three indices were constructed that combined answers to multiple questions, one for each dimension of attitudes. The indices were constructed in the same way as before, allowing for an analysis of trends over time. Finally, two combined indices, one for antisemitism and one for Islamophobia, were based on the three sub-indices. The questions included in the indices and how they were constructed are described in the 2022 report, available on the Center's [webpage](#). This report also presents the results of previous attitude surveys, including results from map-

pings of attitudes and experiences among Jews and Muslims in Norway. In addition to the quantitative interview surveys, qualitative studies were also conducted in 2017 and 2022, providing a valuable supplement to the statistical analysis. In 2022, a separate survey was conducted on attitudes among Norwegian youth.

In depth analyses of the results from the first two waves (2011 and 2017) are presented in the book *The Shifting Boundaries of Prejudice: Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Contemporary Norway*, published by Scandinavian University Press in 2020.

The data collection for the present survey was conducted by Verian (formerly Kantar and TNS Gallup) on a sample drawn from a web panel (GallupPanel). A total of 4705 individuals were invited to participate. Of these, 1031 responded, representing 21.9% of the invited gross sample. The results were weighted by gender, age, and geographical distribution to match the population's composition. The main findings from the 2024 survey are presented below. The first part of this report concerns the results for attitudes to Jews; part two shows the results for attitudes to Muslims, and part three of the results for questions related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tables for all results are found in the appendix.

PART 1: ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS

The results show an increase in all three dimensions of negative attitudes towards Jews compared to the 2022 survey:


- The percentage with a high value on the prejudice index (support for traditional stereotypes) increased from 9.3% to 11.5%.
- The percentage with a high value on the social distance index increased from 3.9% to 5.5%.
- The percentage with a high value on the dislike index increased from 4.7% to 8.6%.
- The percentage with a high value on the combined index (high value on at least two of the sub-indices) increased from 4.5% to 7.6%.

The changes are statistically significant, meaning they are unlikely to be the result of differences in the sample selection. They also signify a change: while we measured a gradual decrease in the prevalence of antisemitism from 2011 to 2022, this trend has reversed in 2024.

The increase does not change the main impression from previous surveys, namely that traditional antisemitic attitudes are not particularly prevalent in Norway. Traditional antisemitic attitudes here refers to the three dimensions described above, including stereotypical beliefs with a long history in Europe, social distance towards Jews, and negative attitudes on an emotional level (dislike and lack of sympathy). Directly comparing survey results in various countries is problematic due to different analysis methods and content of the surveys, but the general picture is that Norway (still) remains at a similar level to other countries in Northwestern Europe.

The prejudice index shows that 11.5% of the population in 2024 have pronounced prejudices against Jews, meaning they support at least three of the six traditional antisemitic stereotypes used in the index. Among the statements with the highest increase in support are “Jews consider themselves to be better than others”

Figure 1.



High scores on three dimensions of antisemitism (%)

(supported by 21%) and “Jews have enriched themselves at the expense of others” (17%). Twelve per cent of the population support the statement “Jews have themselves to blame for being persecuted”. See tables 1 and 2 in the appendix.

There are many possible explanations for the recorded increase. Although it is not possible to know for certain what lies behind the respondents' answers, it is reasonable to interpret the results as being influenced by the debate on the ongoing war. The public debate about Israel and the warfare in Gaza may feed into existing generalized beliefs or strengthen latent negative attitudes to Jews. An example is how “Zionism” in the discourse has been linked to a racist attitude and belief in Jewish superiority, which might be part of the explanation for increased support for the statement “Jews consider themselves to be better than others.” Furthermore, one-third (30%) of the respondents support a statement that Israel's warfare in Gaza has made them more negatively inclined towards Jews in general (table 19).

The most notable change since 2022 has occurred in the index measuring dislike towards Jews (8.6% in 2024 compared to 4.7% in 2022). The index for social distance shows a smaller change (5.5% compared to 3.9%). See tables 4, and 6 in the appendix.

The overall index for antisemitism indicates the proportion of respondents who have high scores on two or three of the three sub-indices. Here, the results show an increase from 4.5% to 7.6%. See table 7 in the appendix.

NEW STATEMENTS

The results from the new questions (table 8) clearly show support for the idea that Jews are good Norwegian citizens (78%). Only 4% responded negatively to this claim. At the same time, 28% support a statement claiming Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country where they live. The idea that Jews are disloyal members of society is an antisemitic notion with a long

history in Europe. Fourteen percent believe that Jews lack the ability to show sympathy towards the suffering of others.

WHO HAS NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS JEWS?

Antisemitism is more prevalent among men and people with lower education levels than among women and people with higher education levels. This reflects findings from previous surveys. Antisemitism is least prevalent in the youngest age group (18–29 years). There are no age-related differences among other respondents.


PART 2: ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS

The survey shows no significant changes in the prevalence of anti-Muslim attitudes in the population. The proportion with high values on the prejudice index is 31.3% (30.7% in 2022). The proportion with high values on the social distance index is 14.6% (15.3% in 2022), and the proportion with high values on the dislike index is 23.3% (23.7% in 2022). Finally, the proportion with high values on the combined index (high values on at least two sub-indices) is 22.1% (22.6% in 2022).

lim presence in Europe, such as Muslims posing a terror threat and being unwilling to integrate. Another interpretation is that the war is having little influence on attitudes towards Muslims because, when it comes to the Palestinians, it is perceived as a territorial rather than an identity-based conflict.

However, the war does not seem to be entirely insignificant, as we can see from the survey's direct question about attitudinal influence: 34.7% agree with the

Figure 2.



High value for the indices for Islamophobia (%):

The results indicate that the population's attitudes towards Muslims are less influenced by the current situation in the Middle East than attitudes towards Jews, or perhaps that the ongoing debate has not changed established views.

A reasonable explanation for this stability is that prejudices against Muslims typically refer to the Mus-

statement " Hamas' terrorist attacks on October 7 have made me more negative towards Muslims in general." Nevertheless, the proportion is much higher if we move the question out of the Middle East: 56.7% agree and partly agree with the statement "Terror in the name of Islam has made me more negative towards Muslims in general." The difference in response rates to the two

questions strengthens the interpretation that the situation in Europe is a primary point of reference when it comes to prejudices against Muslims, not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The most prevalent prejudices against Muslims are, as in the previous surveys, the belief that Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture (34%) and that Muslims themselves are to blame for increasing anti-Muslim harassment (45%). Support for the statement “Muslims are more violent than others” stands out with an increase of 6% (from 26% to 32%). This may be an effect of the Hamas terrorist attack. Otherwise, the changes are not significant. See Tables 9 and 10 in the appendix.

The dislike index shows a high score among 23.3% of respondents (23.7% in 2022). The proportion expressing social distance is also the same as earlier (15.3% in 2022 compared to 14.6% in 2024). See Tables 12, and 14 in the appendix.

The percentage who believes that Muslims are good Norwegian citizens is 61%, also the same as in 2022.

The combined index shows the proportion of respondents who have what we have defined as Islamophobic attitudes, meaning they score high on two of the three sub-indices. This result, 22.1%, is also the same as in 2022. See Table 15 in the appendix.

NEW STATEMENTS

The survey contained a set of new questions about attitudes towards Muslims, see Table 16. The statement “Muslims cannot be entirely trusted” was supported by 19.6%, while “Muslims are a threat to Europe’s Jews” was supported by 23.8%. Claims that Muslims are untrustworthy have a long history as an anti-Muslim belief (“they speak with a forked tongue”). The claim that Muslims pose a threat to Jews also reflects a well-known accusation against Muslims in Europe. In 2017 and 2022, the Norwegian Holocaust centre measured relatively widespread support for stereotypical beliefs against Jews among Muslims in Norway, particularly when it

came to ideas about international and economical power. Social distance towards Jews was approximately the same among Muslim respondents as in the general population.

WHO HAS NEGATIVE ATTITUDES TOWARDS MUSLIMS?

Negative attitudes towards Muslims are more prevalent among men and those with lower education levels than among women and those with higher education levels. This was also found in the previous surveys. Negative attitudes are most prevalent among the oldest respondents, 60-89 years old.

PART 3: ISRAEL AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

The study included a set of questions that examined attitudes towards Israel and support for the parties in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see Table 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21 in the appendix). Some of the questions were new in 2024.


SUPPORT FOR THE PARTIES IN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

As in previous surveys, we asked who the respondents “support most” in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians (table 17 and figure 3). Support for Israel is still relatively low, but stable (11.1% “mostly” or “only” support Israel, compared with 9.3% in 2022). Overall, the survey results indicate a slight increase in support for Israel since 2011. The Palestinians receive significantly more support than in 2022 (31.8% compared to the

previous 23.1%). Many respondents (45%) choose not to take a stand on the question of support for the parties. The result can be interpreted as an indication that the partially polarized debate and intense engagement expressed in the public sphere do not necessarily reflect a similarly divided population. However, the proportion refraining from taking a position has decreased (from 51% in 2022).

The survey in various ways shows an increase in critical perceptions of Israel (see Table 18 in the appendix). This includes attitudes towards Israel’s role in the peace process: the statement “As long as Israel exists, there can be no peace” has gained support (from 24% to 28%). Similarly, we have measured a decrease in the belief that Israeli leaders want peace (16% in 2024 compared to 21% in 2022). Trust in Palestinian leaders’ desire

Figure 3.



Who do you most support in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians?

for peace is now twice as high as trust in Israelis' (and the same as in 2022, slightly over 30%).

However, both in 2022 and 2024, we have measured strong support for the statement that both Israelis and Palestinians have the right to their own state, with a small increase in 2024. This should primarily be interpreted as support for a Palestinian state, as Israel already exists.

The slight increase in support for the statement claiming Israel is at the forefront in the fight against Islamist terror might reflect that Israel's military campaign in Gaza is associated with Hamas' terrorist attacks on October 7. A relatively large proportion (28%) believe that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country in which they reside. This question was new in 2024, see table 8 in the appendix.

A clear increase is shown in the support for an analogy between Israel's treatment of the Palestinians and the treatment of Jews during World War II. Over half (51%) of the population says the statement "Israel treats Palestinians as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II" is "completely" or "fairly" accurate (compared with 33% in 2022). Support is significantly higher than in any of the previous measurements. There is especially a strong increase among those who answer, "completely accurate" (from 8 to 21%). See table 18 in the appendix.

Further analyses have been conducted to see if respondents who support statements that make a connection between Israel, Israeli policy, and Jews also tend to score high on traditional antisemitism. Overall, the analyses show a complex picture with a correlation between traditional antisemitic attitudes and support for some of these statements. This complexity also applies to the analogy between the Nazis' treatment of Jews and Israel's treatment of Palestinians.

Most Jews in Europe and scholars of antisemitism perceive similar analogies in connection with descriptions of Israel as expressions of Holocaust distortion and

antisemitism. The victim-perpetrator-reversal which is implied in the statement is a well-known trope from the antisemitic repertoire and can be linked to a belief that Jews themselves are to blame for being persecuted. In addition, the reference to Nazism can be seen as an example of how Israel (or Israelis) are perceived as "the absolute evil" - and thus linked to a historical tendency to present Jews as allies with or the embodiment of evil itself / the devil. In our analyses, however, only a limited proportion of those who support this statement also score high on traditional antisemitism (social distance, support for traditional stereotypes and dislike of Jews). In this regard, the support can be seen as an example of how making an antisemitic statement does not necessarily mean having profound antisemitic attitudes - and of how antisemitic expressions in some cases can be conveyed unintentionally.

It is often pointed out that lack of knowledge of history can explain the use of analogies of this kind, but lack of knowledge cannot explain the significant increase (from 33% to 51%) in support for the statement (no similar decrease of knowledge can have taken place in the two years that have passed between the surveys). Rather, the increase is likely to reflect a widespread Israel-critical opinion and massive media coverage of the war in Gaza and suffering of its civilian population. In this interpretation, the support mainly reflects a need to strongly criticize Israel. Nevertheless, the result indicates a lack of understanding of and sensitivity to Holocaust distortion, and a public debate in which the threshold for making extremely negative statements about Israel appears to be lower than before.

Specifically, references to an ongoing "genocide" are now a visible part of the debate, a development that is also linked to the investigation in the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which was ongoing at the time of the data collection and in which Israel was accused of genocide against the Palestinians.

VIEWS ON PERSONAL ATTITUDES AND INFLUENCE FROM THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT / WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HAMAS

A set of questions addressed respondents' own views on how the war affects their attitudes (table 19). As mentioned, we have measured an increase in the proportion who openly state that Israeli policies has made them more negatively inclined towards Jews in general (from 26% to 33%). A new, more limited (or specific) statement related to Israel's warfare in Gaza has similar support (30%). A slightly higher proportion (35%) respond that Hamas' attack on October 7 has influenced their views on Muslims negatively.

VIEWS ON VIOLENCE AND HARASSMENT OF JEWS AND MUSLIMS

Two questions focused on support for harassment and violence directed at Jews (due to Israeli policy) and Muslims (due to recent terrorist attacks) (Table 20). The results show slightly lower support than in 2022, both for violence and harassment directed at Muslims (8% support compared to 10% in 2022) and towards Jews (6% compared to 10% in 2022). The change can be attributed to the fact that in 2024, more clearly than before, we emphasized that it applied to Jews and Muslims in Europe (previously this was only mentioned in the introduction text). Regarding the statement about violence against Jews, it is also possible that the decrease is due to how the threat against Norwegian Jews has been discussed several times in the media, which has raised awareness of the problem.

APPENDIX

Table 1. Prejudice against Jews (Per cent)

How well do these statements fit with your own views?		Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer/ NA	Rather well	Completely	Completely + Rather well
Jews consider themselves to be better than others	2011	15,8	21,6	36,3	19,9	6,4	26,3
	2017	20,0	23,7	38,4	13,6	4,3	17,9
	2022	22,8	24,0	35,5	13,2	4,6	17,8
	2024	23,3	25,1	30,5	15,4	5,7	21,1
Jews have far too much influence on the global economy	2011	17,1	24,5	37,5	16,4	4,4	20,9
	2017	19,8	26,0	41,4	9,7	3,1	12,8
	2022	25,7	20,7	39,3	10,6	3,7	14,3
	2024	27,8	24,6	31,1	11,6	4,8	16,4
World Jewry is working behind the scenes to promote Jewish interests	2011	17,4	20,7	42,9	15,2	3,9	19,0
	2017	20,9	21,2	44,8	9,6	3,5	13,1
	2022	25,7	19,6	41	10,9	2,9	13,8
	2024	28,5	20,6	36,8	10,4	3,8	14,2
Jews have always caused problems in the countries in which they live	2011	27,2	30,3	27,9	11,2	3,4	14,6
	2017	31,0	31,2	29,4	6,0	2,3	8,3
	2022	37,9	27,3	25,2	7,5	2,1	9,6
	2024	35,3	27,5	25,1	9,4	2,6	12,0
Jews have enriched themselves at the expense of others	2011	22,2	28,1	35,1	11,8	2,8	14,6
	2017	23,1	28,6	36,7	9,0	2,6	11,6
	2022	28,7	24,6	34,7	8,5	3,5	11,9
	2024	26,7	26,0	30,7	13,0	3,7	16,7
Jews have themselves to blame for being persecuted	2011	38,6	27,1	21,7	10,3	2,3	12,6
	2017	39,4	30,5	22,0	6,4	1,7	8,2
	2022	44,5	25,4	22,1	6,1	1,9	8,0
	2024	41,2	26,9	20,0	8,9	2,9	11,8
Index points		0	0	0	1	2	

Table 2. Index of prejudice against Jews (Per cent)

Index of prejudice against Jews	Index score					High: 4-12
	0	1-3	4-6	7-9	10-12	
2011	55,0	32,9	7,4	3,3	1,3	12,1
2017	69,2	22,5	5,0	1,9	1,4	8,3
2022	69,2	21,6	5,7	2,2	1,3	9,3
2024	65,5	22,9	6,7	3,2	1,6	11,5

Table 3. Dislike of and sympathy for Jews (Per cent)

How well does this statement fit with your own views?		Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer/ NA	Rather well	Completely	Completely + Rather well
I have a certain dislike of Jews	2011	43,4	33,9	11,5	9,5	1,7	11,2
	2017	48,5	32,7	11,3	5,9	1,6	7,5
	2022	55,0	27,7	10,9	5,1	1,2	6,3
	2024	49,2	29,4	10,9	8,5	2,0	10,5
I have a particular sympathy for Jews	2011	21,3	31,7	20,3	20,8	5,9	26,7
	2017	22,0	27,6	23,2	20,8	6,3	27,1
	2022	17,5	25,5	23,7	25,5	7,7	33,2
	2024	16,1	24,9	24,1	25,9	9,0	34,9

Table 4. Index for dislike of Jews (Per cent)

Index for dislike	Index score			High: 1-2
	0	1	2	
2011	90,2	8,4	1,5	9,8
2017	93,3	5,2	1,5	6,7
2022	95,3	3,9	0,8	4,7
2024	91,4	7,0	1,6	8,6

Table 5. Social distance from Jews (Per cent)

To what extent would you like or dislike...		Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Don't know / NA.	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Dislike a little + a lot
... having Jews as neighbours?	2011	13,6	73,0	2,9	7,4	3,2	10,6
	2017	13,6	75,4	4,0	5,3	1,7	7,0
	2022	16,5	73,7	4,0	4,6	1,2	5,8
	2024	16,1	72,7	3,8	5,6	1,8	7,4
... having Jews in your circle of friends?	2011	13,9	72,8	3,4	6,4	3,4	9,8
	2007	17,9	70,5	4,6	5,0	2,0	7,0
	2022	19,8	69,5	5,6	4,0	1,1	5,1
	2024	20,2	69,1	4,3	4,3	2,1	6,4
Index points		0	0	0	1	2	

Table 6. Index of social distance from Jews (Per cent)

Index of social distance	Index score					High: 2-4
	0	1	2	3	4	
2011	88,0	3,5	5,0	0,6	2,9	8,5
2017	91,6	2,5	4,0	0,3	1,6	5,9
2022	92,9	3,2	2,5	0,5	0,9	3,9
2024	91,2	3,4	3,5	0,4	1,6	5,5

Table 7. Combined index of three dimensions of negative attitudes towards Jews (Per cent)

Combined index of antisemitism	Index score				High: 2-3
	0	1	2	3	
2011	79,8	12,4	5,3	2,4	7,8
2017	86,7	7,9	3,4	2,1	5,5
2022	88,1	7,4	3,1	1,4	4,5
2024	84,4	8,0	5,3	2,4	7,6

Table 8. New statements about Jews (Per cent)

How well do these statements fit with your own views?	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer/ NA	Rather well	Completely	Total	Completely + Rather well
Jews are good Norwegian citizens	1,5	2,6	17,6	39,6	38,7	100	78,3
Jews lack the ability to show sympathy for the suffering of others	35,6	24,7	25,2	11,2	3,2	100	14,4
Jews are more loyal to Israel than to the country they live in	5,5	14,4	52,2	20,9	7,1	100	28,0

Table 9. Prejudice against Muslims (Per cent)

How well do these statements fit with your own views?		Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer/ NA	Rather well	Completely	Completely + Rather well
Muslims largely have themselves to blame for the increase in anti-Muslim harassment	2017	10,8	22,6	19,2	30,9	16,5	47,4
	2022	13,3	25,3	17,2	30,1	14,0	44,1
	2024	14,7	24,4	16,2	31,2	13,5	44,7
Muslims consider themselves morally superior to others	2017	9,7	16,6	28,6	27,6	17,5	45,1
	2022	11,5	20,4	31,5	21,7	15,0	36,6
	2024	14,9	21,6	25,3	26,1	12,1	38,2
Muslims pose a threat to Norwegian culture	2017	15,8	30,0	14,8	24,5	14,8	39,4
	2022	21,3	32,1	13,6	21,1	11,9	33,0
	2024	23,6	29,7	12,4	21,9	12,4	34,3
Muslims do not fit into modern Western society	2017	14,4	31,8	17,4	23,2	13,2	36,4
	2022	18,3	31,5	17,2	22,8	10,2	33,0
	2024	21,0	30,1	15,0	22,3	11,6	33,9
Muslims want to take over Europe	2017	20,1	23,0	26,5	16,6	13,7	30,3
	2022	26,6	23,1	25,6	15,1	9,5	24,7
	2024	29,7	21,5	23,4	15,3	10,0	25,3
Muslims are more violent than others	2017	18,0	27,5	25,6	19,1	9,9	28,9
	2022	22,2	27,5	24,9	15,9	9,6	25,6
	2024	24,0	24,3	19,5	21,6	10,6	32,2
Index points		0	0	0	1	2	

Table 10. Index of prejudice against Muslims (Per cent)

Index of prejudice against Muslims	Index score					High: 4-12
	0	1-3	4-6	7-9	10-12	
2011	37,1	28,8	14,8	9,7	9,7	34,1
2022	43,5	25,8	15,7	7,9	7,0	30,7
2024	40,3	28,4	16,0	7,1	8,2	31,3

Table 11. Dislike of and sympathy for Muslims (Per cent)

How well do these statements fit with your own views?		Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer / NA.	Rather well	Completely	Completely + Rather well
I have a certain dislike of Muslims	2017	23,1	32,9	13,5	22,5	7,9	30,4
	2022	25,6	35,4	12,6	20,5	5,9	26,4
	2024	29,6	32,7	12,0	20,7	4,9	25,6
I have a particular sympathy for Muslims	2017	32,3	32,9	20,4	11,8	2,6	14,4
	2022	30,8	32,7	20,8	13,5	2,2	15,7
	2024	28,1	30,8	24,0	14,8	2,4	17,2
Index points		0	0	0	1	2	

Table 12. Index of dislike of Muslims (Per cent)

Index of dislike	Index score			High: 1-2
	0	1	2	
2011	72,3	20,4	7,3	27,7
2022	76,3	18,2	5,5	23,7
2024	76,7	18,9	4,4	23,3

Table 13. Social distance from Muslims (Per cent)

To what extent would you like or dislike ...		Would like it	Wouldn't mind it	Don't know / NA	Would dislike it a little	Would dislike it a lot	Dislike a little + a lot
... having Muslims as neighbours.	2011	6,8	62,6	2,7	15,3	12,6	27,8
	2017	8,1	61,1	4,9	15,1	10,9	26,0
	2022	9,1	63,1	5,4	14,7	7,7	22,3
	2024	9,6	64,7	3,5	16,5	5,8	22,3
... having Muslims brought into your circle of friends.	2011	9,5	62,7	3,4	12,8	11,7	24,5
	2017	13,4	59,8	5,9	11,5	9,4	21,0
	2022	14,8	61,6	7,5	9,4	6,8	16,2
	2024	15,1	64,5	4,4	11,2	4,9	16,1
Index points		0	0	0	1	2	

Table 14. Index of social distance from Muslims (Per cent)

Index of social distance from Muslims	Index score					High: 2-4
	0	1	2	3	4	
2017	72,2	8,2	9,1	2,1	8,4	19,6
2022	76,3	8,4	7,6	2,2	5,5	15,3
2024	75,3	10,1	8,9	1,9	3,8	14,6

Table 15. Combined index of three dimensions of negative attitudes towards Muslims (Per cent)

Combined index of Islamophobia	0	1	2	3	High: 2-3
2017	59,2	13,8	13,4	13,6	27,0
2022	62,8	14,1	12,2	10,9	22,6
2024	63,2	14,7	11,8	10,3	22,1

Table 16. New statements about Muslims

	Not at all	Rather badly	Rather well	Completely	Impossible to answer	Completely + Rather well	Completely + Rather well
Muslims are good Norwegian citizens.	4,3	14,3	42,1	18,8	20,5	60,9	2017: 53.6 2022: 62.4
Muslims are not entirely to be trusted.	27,7	30,8	14	5,6	21,8	19,6	-
Muslims are a threat to Europe's Jews.	20,4	21,7	15,8	8	34	23,8	-

Table 17. People have different views about the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Who do you support most? (Per cent)

	Solely Israel	Mostly Israel	To some extent Israel	Neither	Impossible to answer / NA	To some extent Pal.	Mostly Pal.	Solely Pal.	Solely/ mostly Isr.	Solely + mostly Pal.
2011	1,3	6,8	4,7	30,3	20,8	12,7	21,1	2,2	8,1	23,3
2017	2,1	6,7	4,5	31,9	22,3	10,5	18,3	3,6	8,8	21,9
2022	2,0	7,3	4,6	30,9	20,0	12,1	19,4	3,8	9,3	23,1
2024	3,1	8,0	4,5	28,8	16,4	7,4	21,9	9,9	11,1	31,8

Table 18. Views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Per cent)

How well do these statements fit with your own views?		Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer / NA.	Rather well	Completely	Total	Completely + Rather well
Israeli leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict.	2011	12,9	32,1	34,2	16,6	4,2	100	20,9
	2017	10,0	31,2	37,0	17,8	4,1	100	21,9
	2022	10,4	29,5	38,8	16,5	4,7	100	21,3
	2024	24,2	33	26,6	11,6	4,5	100	16,1
Israel is at the forefront of the war against Islamic extremism.	2011	12,4	20,4	46,9	15,9	4,4	100	20,3
	2017	8,0	20,9	51,9	14,7	4,5	100	19,2
	2022	7,4	18,1	52,7	16,1	5,7	100	21,8
	2024	12,1	19,2	43,4	17,7	7,6	100	25,3
As long as the State of Israel exists, there can be no peace.	2011	24,9	23,7	35,6	11,7	4,1	100	15,8
	2017	13,2	20,9	45,6	15,8	4,6	100	20,4
	2022	14,5	19,1	42,4	16,8	7,1	100	24,0
	2024	17,5	17,2	37,7	19,3	8,2	100	27,5
Israel treats the Palestinians just as badly as the Jews were treated during World War II.	2011	11,5	21,0	29,4	29,1	9,0	100	38,1
	2017	9,9	20,5	37,3	25,4	6,9	100	32,2
	2022	12,6	19,8	34,8	24,9	7,9	100	32,8
	2024	11,2	14,0	24,4	29,8	20,6	100	50,5
Both the Israelis and the Palestinians are entitled to a state of their own.	2011	2,5	3,7	17,4	27,8	48,6	100	76,4
	2017	2,2	4,4	23	30,9	39,5	100	70,3
	2022	2,1	4,1	23,8	31,0	38,9	100	69,9
	2024	3,1	5,8	18,8	27,0	45,3	100	72,3
Palestinian leaders genuinely want to find a solution to the conflict.	2011	6,1	21,8	34,4	31,6	6,2	100	37,7
	2017	7,2	19,2	40,4	28,1	5,0	100	33,1
	2022	6,8	19,1	41,7	25,9	6,6	100	32,4
	2024	11,5	23,1	34,5	24,5	6,3	100	30,8

Table 19. Views of own attitudes (Per cent)

How well do these statements fit with your own views?	Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer / NA.	Rather well	Completely	Total	Completely + Rather well
Terrorism in the name of Islams has made me more negative towards Muslims in general.	11,4	20,2	11,8	35,1	21,6	100	56,7
Israeli policies have made me more negative towards Jews in general.	21,8	28,5	16,9	24,0	8,8	100	32,8
Hamas' terrorist attack on October 7 has made me more negative towards Muslims in general.	20,3	27,1	17,9	22,1	12,6	100	34,7
Israels warfare in Gaza has made me more negative towards Jews in general.	22,1	31,1	17,3	20,6	8,9	100	29,5

Table 20. Views about harassment and violence against Jews and Muslims (Per cent) *

How well do these statements fit with your own views?		Not at all	Rather badly	Impossible to answer / NA.	Rather well	Completely	Total	Completely + Rather well
Considering how Israel treats the Palestinians, harassment and violence against Jews [in Europe] are justifiable	2017	39,7	23,3	25,3	9,7	2,0	100	11,7
	2022	41,4	22,4	26,3	7,5	2,4	100	9,9
	2024	62,4	13,9	17,8	4,6	1,4	100	[6,0]
Considering recent terrorist attacks, harassment and violence against Muslims [in Europe] are justifiable	2017	46,5	25,7	17,8	7,3	2,8	100	10,1
	2022	49,7	21,6	18,6	7,6	2,6	100	10,2
	2024	60,6	14,5	16,9	5,4	2,6	100	[8,0]

*Results from 2024 are not directly comparable with those from 2022 due to a change in the wording. In 2022, the reference to Europe was only made in the introduction, while it was part of the statement in 2024.

Table 21. Conspiracy mentality and views on Hamas' terrorist attack

	Not at all	Rather badly	Rather well	Completely	Impossible to answer	Completely + Rather well	2022 Completely + Rather well
Incidents which apparently have nothing to do with each other are often the result of secret activities.	10,6	11,8	19	3,2	55,4	22,2	15,2
Israel allowed Hamas' terrorist attack on October 7 to take place to gain the opportunity to go to war against Gaza.	21,9	13	10,3	3,8	51,0	14,1	-

